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Increases in the capital stock within the non-  relending by creditors.  It also predicts that new
convex range increase debtor borrowing oppor-  money (or interest capitalization) is in the
tunities.  Conversely, a temporary liquidity  interest of creditors and will be part of a debt
shock may permanently lower the economy's  restructuring strategy - as it was recently for
growth path.  Mexico and the Philippines.
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1. Introduotlo"
1.1  Notivation
Recent  theoretical  contributions  to the  theory  of growth  [Romer
(1986),  Lucas  (1988)]  have  examined  the  ability  of increasing  returns  to scale
models  to  explain  "anomalous"  observed  growth  patterns. For  example,  the
well-known  "Solow  residual"  observed  empirically  in  growth  studies  is  more
consistent  with  a  model  of increasing  returns  to scale  than  the  standard
neoclassical  growth  model. In  addition,  the  neoclassical  growth  model  has
been  shown  to  predict  movements  in the  behavior  of  aggregate  variables,  such
as interest  rates,  which  have  not  been substantiated  by empirical  observation
[King  and  Rebelo  (1988)].  Although  the  source  of increasing  returns  within
non-neoclassical  models  is  still  a quite  controversial  topic,  non-convex
models  appear  to  be superior  in  explaining  some  stylized  facts  concerning
growth.
It seems  natural  to  look  towards  this  new  growth  framework  when
attempting  to  explain  certain  anomalies  in the  recent  borrowing  experience  of
highly  indebted  countries  (HIC's).  One  anomaly  concerns  the  persistence  of
credit  difficulties  for  countries  experiencing  what  were  apparently  temporary
shocks.'  A  well-known  adage  in  international  finance  maintains  that  countries
should  borrow  in  response  to  temporary  shocks,  and  adjust  to  permanent  ones
[Sachs  (1981)].  This  contention  does  not  seem  consistent  with  the  recent  HIC
'Of  course,  not  all  shocks  in  the  1980's  were  temporary.  The  fall
in  oil  prices  may be  interpreted  as  a  "permanent"  negative  shock
to  Mexico.  However,  this  leaves  a  large  number  of  net  oil-
importing  HICs'  experiences  to  be  explained.-2-
experience,  where  countries  experiencing  apparently  temporary  liquidity
shortages  found  themselves  unable  to  borrow  further  in  capital  markets.
Secondly,  the  divergent  experiences  of relatively  similar  countries
during  this  period  seems  puzzling. Many seemingly  similar  countries,  in  terms
of country  risk  characteristics  such  as debt-export  or  debt-GDP  ratios,  had
quite  different  debt  experiences  in  the  1980's  (Krueger  (1987)]. Although  one
must  always  take  care  to allow  for  political  and  social  explanations,  as  well
as differences  in  commodity  baskets,  when  assessing  the  experiences  of  a
cross-section  of  nations,  a partial  explanation  for  large  differences  in the
experiences  of relatively  similar  developing  countries  may stem  from  non-
convexities  in  these  countries'  production  functions. In the  presence  of
aggregate  non-convexities,  countries  exhibiting  quite  similar  characteristics
in  levels  may  find  themselves  on quite  different  dynamic  paths. To the  extent
that  credit  is  constrained  by the  growth  rates  of  debtors,  as in  Cohen  and
Sachs  (1986),  differences  in  growth  paths  may affect  borrowing  opportunities.
Finally,  the  introduction  of  non-convexities  into  the  productLon
process  may  motivate  some  beliefs  about  debt  overhang  policies. A result
which  differentiates  a  non-convex  model  of debt  from  its  constant-returns-to-
scale  counterpart  concerns  the  possibility  of rational  levels  of "new  money"
from  the  creditor's  viewpoint. In  addition,  the  minimum  rational  levels  of
new  lending  derived  below  may  help  to  explain  why  countries  failing  to acquire
sufficiently  large  levels  of  new  lending  may  be unable  to acquire  any  new
funds  at  all.  These  intuitive  outcomes  are  contradictory  to  either
neoclassical  Solow-type  or constant-returns-to-scale  models  of  production,  and
provide  further  incentives  for  exploring  non-standard  production  alternatives.
1.2  Framework-3-
In this  paper,  I introduce  a  model  of international  lending  under
sovereign  risk  for  a debtor  nation  whose  aggregate  production  function  is non-
convex  over  physical  capital  within  some  range. The  basic  result  of the  paper
is that  non-convexities  in  an  HIC's  aggregate  production  function  lead  to non-
convexities  in its  borrowing  opportunities  as  well. The  model  yields  a
critical  "threshold"  capital  stock,  located  within  the  range  of increasing
returns. Countries  endowed  with  capital  stocks  above  this  critical  level  find
themselves  on a "high  growth  path,"  converging  to  a  high steady  state  level  of
growth  and  capital  accumulation.  This  growth  process  is  aided  by active
participation  of the  debtor  nation  in foreign  borrowing  activities.  Countries
finding  themselves  below  the  critical  capital  stock  level  respond  optimally  by
pursuing  a consumption  pattern  which  leads  to a depletion  of the  capital  stock
to a low  constant  returns  to scale  range. At sufficiently  low  levels  of
marginal  capital  productivity,  the  HIC  capital  stock  converges  asymptotically
to the  origin.
It is  assumed  that  the  marginal  product  of capital  within  the  debtor
nation  lies  above  the  world  interest  rate. The  ability  to  participate  in
international  capital  markets  therefore  plays  an important  role  in  determining
the  dynamic  growth  path  of the  debtor  nation. As a result,  the  "critical
capital  stock'  necessary  to  attLin  the  high  growth  path is  lower  when  the
debtor  has access  to capital  markets. HIC's  with  capital  stocks  sufficient  to
lead  to  the  high  growth  path  may find  themselves  below  the  critical  capital
stock  level  in the  event  of an international  liquidity  crisis. Moreover,
countries  experiencing  temporary  liquidity  shocks  may find  themselves  on
permanently  lower  growth  paths.-4-
1.3  PreViols  Literature
A growth  model  with  constant  returns  %o  scale  has  been  applied  by
Cohen  and  Sachs  (1986)  to sovereign  debt. They  develop  a model  in  which
default  decisions  are  based  upon  comparisons  of costs  of debt  service  with
standard  "default  Penalty"  [Eaton  and  Gersovitz  (1981)]  specifications.
Increasing  returns  to  scale  models  based  upon  capital  accumulation
have  been  studied  by Romer  (1986),  Lucas  (1988),  and  Azariadis  and  Drazen
(1988). These  "production  externality"  models  have  helped  to explain  "Rostow-
type"  (1960)  patterns  of take  off  stages  in  empirically-observed  growth
patterns. While  Romer  has stressed  increasing  returns  to  physical  capital,
through  expansion  of production  processes,  the  Lucas  and  Azariadis  and  Drazen
approaches  have  stressed  human  capital  accumulation  as the  engine  of growth.
Deterministic  models  of dynamic  optimization  with  an "S-shaped
production  function"  for  physical  capital  have  been  studied  by MaJumdar  and
Mitra  (1982,1983)  and  by Dechert  and  Nishimura  (1983). The  analysis  was
extended  to  the  stochastic  case  by Majumdar,  Mitra  and  Nyarko  (1988). Their
models  show  that  varieties  of  discounting  magnitudes  and  capital  stocks  can
yield  alternative  equilibrium  growth  paths  for  optimizing  agents.
1.4  Organization
The  paper  is  organized  as follows:  Section  2 lays  out  the  basic  model
of  borrowing  with a  non-convex  production  function. Section  3  investigates
the  critical  mass  argument  associated  with  aggregate  non-convexities.  Section
4 introduces  the  problem  of  a debtor  facing  a "debt  overhang"  within  the  non-
convex  range,  and  examines  the  relative  merits  of debt  policies  such  as debt-5-
forgivenesL.  or "new  money"  in a  non-convex  framework. Section  5  examines  the
possibility  of  both  HIC-specific  and  international  liquidity  shortages.
Lastly,  section  6  provides  some  conclusions  and  possibilities  for  extension.
2. Thejiatt
2.1  Notation
The  model  is  c..e  of a representative  agent  wbo  faces  a credit
constraint  in international  capital  markets. The  extensive  form  of the  game
has four  stages:  First,  creditors  determine  the  level  of the  ceiling,  h(kt)  on
new  credit  extension,  based  upon  full  knowledge  of the  debtor's  reaction
function.  Secondly,  the  debtor  government  chooses  whether  or  not to  service
the  outstanding  debt  burden, r,t  where  r  is  equal to ;+r,  the  exogenous
interest  rate  charged  on lending,  and  Dt  is  the  nominal  amount  of c,utstanding
debt  in  period  t.  It is  assumed  that  this  ceiling  is  binding,  so that  the
level  of new  credit  extended  is  equal  to  this  ceiling,  rDt-h(k.).  Thirdly,
the  debtor  produces  output,  Q(kt),  given  the  current  capital  stock,  kt.  In the
fourth  stage,  the  debtor  chooses  consumption,  ct,  and investment,  It.
If  the  debtor  services  the  debt,  the  game  is repeated  as  before.
However,  if  the  debtor  has  defaulted,  he suffers  a loss  in  productivity  and is
barred  from  future  activity  in international  capital  markets,  as in the
standard  sovereign  debt  literature  [Eaton  and  Gersovitz  (1981)]. Credit
extensions  are  constrained  to the  level  at  which  the  debtor  is indifferent
between  defaulting  and  servicing  his  debt  obligations.  It is  assumed  that  the
debtor  chooses  to service  the  debt  at this  indifference  level.-6-
2.2  The  Production  Process
I introduce  a  production  process  which  is  non-convex  at low  levels  of
the  capital  stock,  ko 0 exhibiting  increasing  returns  to scale,  as in  Dechert
and  Nishimura  (1983). This  range  of increasing  returns  to  scale  is  bounded  by
two  regions  which  exhibit  constant  returns  to  scale  in  physical  capital. The
production  process  satisfies:
1.  Q is twice  continuously  differentiable  on [O,c),  with  Q'>O and
Q(O)-O;
2.  There  exists  a  high  capital  stock,  Ic 5, and  a low  capital  stock,  kL,
such  that  Q"(k 0)-O if  k.2k,  or  kokL.
3.  A region  of increasing  marginal  productivity  of  physical  capital
exists  over -le  range  k,<k,<1c,,  such  that  Q"(ko)>O  within  this  range.
These  assumptions  result  in  a  production  function  similar  to the  "S-
shaped"  production  function  utilized  by Dechert  and  Nishimura,  bounded  by two
regions  of constant  returns  to scale  similar  to the  production  function  found
in  Cohen  and  Sachs  (1986). The  distinction  between  the  "S-shaped"  production
function  above  and  its  counterpart  in  the  standard  neoclassical  growth  model
is that  it is  convex  on the  interval  [kL,kH]  and  exhibits  constant  returns  to
capital  in intervals  (--,kL]  and [k 8,,*).
The increasing  returns  to scale  range  can  be interpreted  as a takeoff
stage  in  which  production  externalities  are  prevalent,  bounded  by two
alternative  equilibrium  paths  of steady  state  endogenous  growth. 2 This
2See  Azariadis  and  Drazen  (1988)  for  a similarly-specified
production  externality  model.-7-
specification  allows  for  continued  endogenous  growth,  while  distinguishing  a
"takeoff"  range  in  the  development  process. Moreover,  constraints  faced  *n
international  capital  markets  will  have implications  for  the  growth  paths  of
the  developing  countries.
Even  under  this  novel  pro6uction  function,  however,  the  activities  of
creditors  are  going  to  be qualitatively  similar  to  constant-returns-to-scale
growth  models  of  debt (Cohen  and  Sachs  (1986)1.  Creditors  limit  the  amount  of
new lending  such  that  Vd(k 0), the  discounted  value  of  current  and  future
utility  given  default,  is  less  than  Vr(kO,Do),  the  discounted  value  of  current
and  future  utility  given  debt  service  and  the  stock  of outstanding  debt.  Let
h(ko)  be the  resulting  credit  ceiling. It  satisfies  the  condition:
(2.1)  rDo  - h(ko) iff  Vd(kO,DO)  - Vr(ko,Do).
2.3  Borrower  decision  problem
It is  assumed  that  aggregate  production  economies  are  external  to
private  agents,  who face  a  private  constant-returns-to-scale  production
function. The  debtor  government  exogenously  allocates  its  borrowing  to its
private  constituents.  Default  on these  private  loans  is ruled  out  for
simplicity. 3
Individual  consumption  and  investment  decisions  are  made to  maximize
private  utility. It is  assumed  that  private  !  vestors  are  price  takers  in  all
markets. The  utility  function  in  each  period,  u(ct),  is  twice  continuously
differentiable,  where  u'>O,  u"<O,  and  lim-0 u'(c)  - +X.
3As long  as capital  flight  is  prohibited,  this  assumption  is  valid
since  domestic  defaults  merely  redistribute  domestic  income,  leaving
the  creditworthiness  of the  debtor  nation  unchanged.An explicit  investment  cost  is required  within  the  range  of constant
returns  to  avoid  infinite  investment  or disinvestment.  Let  Jt,  the  flow  of
investment  expenditure,  be related  to  new  investment  by the  relationship:
(2.2)  Jt  - Jt(It,Kt)  - It  +  (1/2)0It/Kt]  -
The decision  problem  faced  by a  private  agent  within  tne  debtor  nation
is to  maximize:
(2.3)  uo  - 20T  tu(ct).
subject  ti:
a.  ct  +  Jt(It,kt)  - f(kt)-  dt+1
b. ktAl  - kt(l-6)  +  It
C.  'F  >  0
where  d,+ 1 is  the  endowment  of new  money  distributed  to  the  private  sector  by
the  government,  which  is  serviced  at identical  exogenous  rates  idt. 6 is the
rate  of  depreciation  on old  capital. Assuming  that  the  non-negativity
constraint  is  not  binding,  and  that  the  transversality  condition  holds  in  the
limit,  I  obtain  the  Euler  condition  faced  by private  consumer/investors:
U'  [f(kt- 1)  +  Dt  - Jt- 1 (It- 1,kt- 1)  - rDt,]
(2.4)  f'(kt)  _
Pu'  (f(kt)  +  Dt+1  - Jt(It,kt)  - rDt]-9-
Dechert  and  Nishimura  show  that  the  optimal  path  solution  co  this  type
of problem  is  monotonic,  ie if  ko  and  ko represent  initial  capital  stocks
with  k,'>k,,  then  either  k1'>k,  or k1'<k,  always,  depending  upon  whether  ko  and
koI  are  above  or  below  the  critical  capital  stock  described  below,  Moreover,
they  show  that  every  optimal  path  converges  to  a steady  state.
It  can  be seen  that  the  dynamic  path  is  not,  invariant  to the  level  of
discounting  of the  debtor  nation.  It is  convenient  to  distinguish  between
three  ranges  of discounting:  "Mild  discounting,"  defined  as Of'  2 1,  was  shown
b:  Majumdar  and  Mitra  (1982)  to  converge  to a steady  state  level  of  capital
k . "Strong  discounting,"  defined  as Bf(k)<k  ,  was  shown  by the  same  authors
to  have an  optimal  path leading  to a steady  state  at the  origin.4
Holding  m  constant,  equation  (2.4)  determines  the  conditions  under  which
growth  takes  place.
Tha  critical  capital  stock,  kI,  will  be that  which  satisfies
Pf(k,)-l,  where  f(k 0) represents  Lhe  "borrowing-enhanced"  private  production
function:  f(k.)  - f(k 0) +  Dt+l  - rD.. For  aggregate  capital  stock  below  kc,
the  equilibrium  path for  the  capital  stock  converges  to the  origin.  This
involves  running  the  capital  stock  down  to  zero  over  some  period  of time.
Above  kc,  the  economy  converges  to  an upper  steady  state,  k*. A lower  steady
state,  kI,  also  exists  in the  Dechert  and  Nishimura  model.  However,  this
steady  state  is  locally  unstable.  Moreover,  the  authors  show  that  this  steady
state  is  not  attained,  even  for  ko  >  k*. 5
The introduction  of  high  and  low  level  constant  return  ranges  does
nothing  to  affect  results  concerning  the  existence  of a critical  capital
4In the  case  of a concave  utility  function,  the  capital  stock  only
converges  to the  origin  asymptotically.  Therefore  actual  depletion
of the  capital  stock  is  never  reached.
5The  exceptional  case  is  ko-k.,  which  is  an  unstable  equilibrium  in
the  Dechert  and  Nishimura  model.-10-
stock,  kc. For  ko<k.,  the  marginal  product  of capital  is  monotonically
declining  towards  the  constant  return  range  f'(k)-fL'(k),  while  for  ko>k,,  the
marginal  product  of capital  is  monotonically  increasing  towards  the  constant
return  range  f'(k)-fH'(k).  This  simple  setup  allows  for  the  incorporation  of
a critical  capital  stock  in  a model  of endogenous  growth  with  alternative
potential  equilibrium  growth  paths.
The  benevolent  debtor  government  acts  as the  international  borrowing
agent  for  the  private  sector. Given  the  credit  constraint,  Dt,h(kt),  the
debtor  government  borrows  up to the  credit  ceiling  and  distributes  the  funds
to its  private  sector. It then  collects  past  due  loan  payments  and  decides
whether  to service  debt  or default. This  choice  is  made  by comparison  of
aggregate  discounted  utility  in the  default  and  repayment  regimes. In the
event  of default,  it  returns  revenues  from  private  debt  service  to its
domestic  citizens. It  maximizes  aggregate  utility  as a function  of aggregate
consumption.  The  debtor  government  chooses  to  default  if:
(2.5) VZ(kt,Dt)  < Vd(kt)
where  Vr(kt,Dt)  represents  the  discounted  value  of current  and  future  income
subject  to the  choice  of  debt  service:
(2.6)  Vr(kt,Dd)  - max ZSt-  ptU(c)
subject  to (2.4)  and  the  aggregate  budget  constraints:
a. Dt+1  - Q(Kt) - Ct - dDt-  - Jt(It,kt)
b. kt+ 1 - (l-6)kt  + It.-11-
Q(kt)  represents  the  aggregate  production  function,  which  incorporates  the
production  externalities  found  in  the  non-convex  range. Q'(kt)>fI(k.)  for  two
reasons: First,  private  agents  take  their  borrowing  opportunities  as
exogenous. Secondly,  private  agents  fail  to  incorporate  the  externalities
associated  with  capital  accumulation  in the  non-convex  range. As  will  be
shown  below,  the  credit  ceiling  will  be increasing  in the  capital  stock  in all
ranges  of the  production  function,  although  at a  more  rapid  rate  within  the
"take-off" range.
2.4  Default  Solution
Following  Cohen  and  Sachs  (1986),  assume  that  the  debtor  is  barred
from  future  access  to  capital  markets  in  the  event  of a  default  and that  a
penalty,  OQ(kt),  is  experienced  as  well,  due  to a loss  in  productivity.  The
existence  of a  default  penalty  is  necessary  to allow  for  rational  satisfaction
of the  transversality  condition,  but is specified  so as to  drive  none  of the
results  below.6
The  optimization  problem  faced  by a private  agent  given  default  by the
debtor  government  satisfies:
(2.6) Vd(kt)  - max  2fi-t  pi  u[ct1
Subject  to:
6The  specification  of the  penalty  function  as increasing  in  debtor
nation  output  yields  the  results  that  the  credit  ceiling  is increasing
in the  capital  stock  even  within  the  constant  returns  to  scale
ranges  of the  production  function.-12-
a. (l-O)f(kt)  - et  +  Jt(It,kt)  2 0
b. kt+ 1 - kt(l-6)  +  It
c.  kt  2 0
Private  maximization  within  the  default  state  leads  to the  Euler
condition:
Uf ((l-e)f(kt  l)  - J-(t,k-)
(2.7)  f'(kt)  -
Pu'[(l-8)f(kt)  - Jt(It,kt)1
or:
(2.8)  ct  <  ct+,  iff  f  I(kt)  <  1
Notice  that  the  non-convex  range  of the  production  function  will
contain  a  similar  "critical  capital  stock"  to that  found  in  the  repayment
regime. The  debtor  nation  in  default  therefore  faces  two  alternative  steady
state  outcomes: Achieving  the  "takeoff"  capital  stock  level,  k.2k 0 , leads  the
debtor  nation  to  the  high  growth  rate  path. However,  countries  experiencing
even  temporary  movements  below  kc  find  themselves  on a dy.amic  path  with  kt
converging  to  zero  asymptotically.
2.5  Debt  Service  Solution
Since  the  model  is deterministic,  the  creditor  will  always  adjust  the
level  of lending  so that  default  does  not  occur. In this  manner,  as in  Cohen-13-
and  Sachs,  the  value  function  of the  debtor  nation  under  default  affects  the
credit  ceiling  faced  by the  debtor,  even  though  actual  default  never  takes
place.
Given  the  rate  of interest,  r  - l+r,  the  debtor  chooses  to service
his debt  burden  when  Vr(k 0,Do)  5  V'(k 0).  The  Bellman  equations  for  these  value
functions  satisfy:
(2.9)  Vr(ko)  - u[  Q(k 0) +  D-  Jl(kl)  - rD\  ]  +  [Vr(k,)]
(2.10) Vd(ko)  - u[(l-O)Q(ko)  - Jj(kj)]  +  p[Vd(k,)]
The  reward  for  debt  service  in this  model  is avoiding  the  production
penalty  and  the  exclusion  from  future  borrowing. The  benefits  from  current
and  future  borrowing  opportunities,  which  are  contingent  upon  debt  service,
are  increasing  in the  current  marginal  product  of capital  Q'(kt). As kt
increases  within  the  take-off  range,  the  marginal  product  of  all  forms  of
investment,  including  debt  service,  will  rise.  For  ko  in  the  interval
kj<kO<(k,  it  follows  that  the  rising  marginal  product  of  capital  brings  with
it  a rise  in  the  returns  to debt  service. Beyond  k1,  however,  the  marginal
benefits  of debt  service  relate  linearly  to  the  capital  stock.  ^
The  new  level  of lending  chosen,  D1, leaves  the  debtor  nation  with a
"borrowing  enhanced"  production  function,  Q(k.),  where  the  original
production  function,  Q(kt),  is  augmented  by the  ability  of the  debtor  nation
to  borrow  from  abroad  at rates  below  its  domestic  marginal  product  of capital.
Note  that  Q(kt)  is  also  totally  determined  by the  capital  stock,  whether  the
debt  ceiling  is  binding  or  not,  since  D*,  the  level  of  optimal  borrowing  by-14-
the  debtor,  is  completely  determined  by kt.  Therefore,  we can  write  the
'borrowing-enhanced"  production  function  as:
(2.11) Q(kt)-Q(kt)  +  Dt+l  -rDt.
The  characteristics  of the  solution  found  by the  creditor  are  stated  as the
first  theorem:
Theorem  1:  If  Q(kt)  is  an "S-shaped"  production  function  satisfying  the
assumptions  above,  then  the  "borrowing  enhanced"  production  function,  Q(kt),
where Q(kt)-f(k.)  +  Dt - rDt1, satisfies the credit constraint, h(kt)2rDt  and
is also  S-shaped.
This  theorem  is  proven  in  three  parts.  I  consider  separately  the
cases:  ko2ks,  kL>kO>k 5, and  koskL,  where  k.i  and  kL  represent  the  high  and  low
points  of inflection  in the  nation's  production  function.
2.5.1  Case  1:  k0 >  k
Within  the  high constant  returns  to scale  range,  the  basic  results  of
Cohen  and  Sachs  go through:  At "high"  capital  stock  levels,  there  is  a  binding
debt  ceiling. Moreover,  this  ceiling  grows  at the  same  rate  as the  economy.
Although  repudiation  never  occurs  in  this  deterministic  framework,  threat  of
repudiation  results  in  a lower  level  of growth  than  that  consistent  with
maximization  of productive  wealth. Given  a  binding  level  of lending,  D.,
which  is  a function  of the  capital  stock,  k.,  it follows  that  there  is  also  a
binding  debt-to-capital  stock  ratio  Dt/kt.  I state  this  result  as  a Lemma:-15-
Laa  1:  The  credit  constraint  faced  by the  debtor,  Dt,  in  the  constant
returns  to  scale  range  kj2ki  grows  with the  capital  stock  k.,  and  the  income
level,  4(k,).
The  proof  can  be found  in  Cohen  and  Sachs  (1986),  and  is  summarized  in
the  appendix.  I am implicitly  assuming  that  kN is  sufficiently  large  so that
the  debtor  nation  avoids  the  range  of "non-binding"  credit  constraint
identified  by those  authors.
An intuitive  argument  for  Lemma  1  can  be obtained  by considering  the
creditor's  lending  decision. Given  the  debtor  country  production  function,
Q(kt),  a debt  ceiling  will  exist  for  any  kt,  based  upon the  debtor  agents
choosing  their  utility-maximizing  consumption  path (Ct). This  debt  ceiling
function,  Dtsh(k.),  defines  an optimal  investment  program  for  debtors  with
access  to  capital  markets. The  value  of remaining  a debtor  in  good  standing
satisfies  equation  (2.9)  above,  where  D1 is  constrained  by the  credit  ceiling.
On the  other  hand,  the  value  of defaulting  in  any  given  period  sati.sfies
equation  (2.10). Cohen  and  Sachs  show  that  in the  range  of constant  returns
to scale,  the  credit  constraint  will  be linear  in  the  debtor  nation  capital
stock:  h*(kt)-c.kt,  where  c is  a constant  and  Dtsh*(kt)  if  and  only  i!.
Vr(kt,Dt)2Vd(kt,D.).  This  linear  debt  ceiling  thus  satisfies bth  debt
constraint  criteria.
The  solution  found  within  this  range  looks  much like  the  Cohsn  and
Sachs  model  at  high  capital  stock  levels. As in their  model,  h(kt)  is
increasing  in f'(kt),  the  marginal  product  of  capital,  P,  the  rate  of  discount
of the  debtor  nation,  and  0,  and  the  "default  penalty,"  while  h is  decreasing
in  r, the  world  rate  of interest.-16-
2.5.2  Case  2:  k<3kO<k
The  difficulty  connected  with  the  determination  of an analytical
solution  for  the  credit  constraint  in a  non-linear  model  has  been  documented
in the  case  of  diminishing  returns  by Cohen  and  Sachs. The  problem  is  that
the  value  function  under  repayment  is  no longer  separable  in  kt  and  Dt. Non-
linearity  implies  that  both  output  and  the  level  of credit  constraint  tomorrow
will  depend  upon  investment  today.
Additional  complications  are  associated  with the  dynamic  programming
problem  in the  presence  of  non-convexitie&i  in the  aggregate  production
function. When  kL<ck<ko,  an increase  in ,.:he  capital  stock  will raise  the
marginal  product  of  capital  within  the  debtor  nation. The  difficulties  of
finding  an analytical  solution  are  compounded  by the  non-uniqueness  of
"optimal  investment  paths"  (Majumdar  and  Hitra  (1982)].  A number  of  potential
optimal  investment  paths  exist  from  any  capital  stock  kt. This  problem  is
solved  here  through  the  externality  assumption.  Since  private  borrowing
opportunities  are  taken  as invariant  to  investment  decisions,  the  solution  is
unique.
Previous  studies  of investment  under  non-convexity  [Dechert  and
Nishimura  (1983)1  have  shown  that  a  monotonic  path  of  positive  or negative
capital  accumulation  will  emerge  under  autarky. The  problem  here  is to
determine  how this  monotonic  path  of  capital  accumulation  under  autarky  will
correspond  to  a modal  with  borrowing  opportunities.
Since  the  marginal  product  of capital  is increasing  in  kt,  our
intuition  would  lead  us to  believe  that  the  ratio  of the  credit  ceiling  to  the
capital  stock  should  also  be increasing  in  kt. The  intuition  behind  this-17-
conjecture  lies  in  the  borrower's  valuation  of arriving  in the  following
period  as a debtor  in  good  standing.  The  "reward"  for  debt  service  is  the
ability  to  borrow  at  world  rates,  adjusted  for  default  premia  and  invest
domestically  with  an expected  marginal  product  return. 7 An increase  in the
capital  stock  within  this  range  increases  this  reward,  resulting  in  an
increase  in  the  credit  ceiling.  This  is  stated  as a lemma:
Lea  2: Given  k,<k" 0 k 5, the  ratio  of the  credit  ceiling,  h(kt),  to the  capital
stock,  kot  is increasing  in  ko.
Lemma  2 is  proven  in the  appendix. Consider  the  credit  constraint,
h*(ko),  which  satisfies:
(2.12)  Vr(k,,D 0)  - Vd(k,)
Totally  differentiating  this  condition  twice  with respect  to  Do  and  ko
yields  the  result  that  a2DO/akO>O  within  the  range  of increasing  marginal
physical  product. Intuitively,  the  marginal  benefits  of  being  able  to  borrow
at  world  rates  and  invest  domestically  are  increasing  within  this  range  in  the
debtor  nation's  capital  stock. It  follows  that  the  penalty  of  exclusion  from
international  capital  markets  is  also  increasing  in  ko. As a result  of the
increased  default  penalty,  the  debtor  will  choose  debt  service  over  default
for  larger  values  of  Do. Therefore,  in  the  range  in  which  f(k 0) is  non-
convex,  kL<kt<kg,  the  credit  ceiling  will  be increasirg  in  ko.
7The  qualitative  results  in the  non-convex  range  are  invariant  to
whether  or  not  the  production  penalty  is increasing  in  the  capital
stock. The  current  specification  was chosen  to satisfy  the
transversality  condition.-18-
Since  h(ko)  is increasing  in  ko  within  this  range,  it  follows  that
Q"(kO)>Q"(kO).  This  result  is  also  proven  in the  appendix. The  easing  of
the  credit  constraint  within  the  "take-off"  range  results  in  an additional
source  of increase  in the  marginal  physical  product  of capital. The  ability
to  borrow  internationally  subject  to  a sovereign  risk  credit  ceiling  increases
the  importance  of non-convex  technologies  in  determining  the  marginal  product
of capital. Differentiating  the  "borrowing-enhanced  production  function  with
respect  to  k,  yields:
(2.13) Q'(kl)  - Q(k1)[h1
1(k1)/JO(IO,kO)] - ;hl  (kl)  >  0.
Note  that  Q'(k,)  >  0, since:
(2.14) QI(k 1)/J 0(IO,k o)I  - r  > 0,
must  be satisfied  for  rational  borrowing.
Notice  the  second  term  in  equation  (2.13).  By  borrowing  at  world
interest  rates  and  investing  domestically,  international  borrowing  becomes  a
source  of domestic  growth. Moreover,  within  the  range  of increasing  returns
to  physical  capital,  the  increase  in the  debt  ceiling  associated  with  an
increase  in the capital stock, 8Dt/8kt,  is an important  part of the
aggregative  marginal  product  of capital. Differentiating  (2.13)  with  respect
to  k,  yields:
(2.15)  Q"(kL)  - Q"(kl)(h. 1(kl)/Jo)]  +  [(Q'(kl)/Jo)-  r]hl"(k 1).-19-
Equation  (2.15)  is  unambiguously  positive  within  the  range  of
increasing  marginal  product  of physical  capital.  It  follows  that  the  marginal
productivity  of  capital  in terms  of the  "borrowing-enhanced"  production
function  will  be increasing  within  this  range  as  well. Moreover,  because  of
the  second  order  effects  of  easing  the  credit  ceiling,  the  ma.rginal
productivity  of the  borrowing-enhanced  production  function  increases  at a
faster  rate  than  the  original  productior.  function.
2.5.3  Case  3:  k0<ck
Since  the  production  function  exhibits  constant  returns  to scale  in
the  range  ko<kL,  the  analysis  here  will  be similar  to  Case  1:
Lmama  3: The  credit  constraint  faced  by the  debtor,  Dt-sh(kt),  in the  constant
returns  to scale  range,  ko<kL,  grows  with the  capital  stock,  k.  and  the
income  level,  Q(kt).
The  proof  of  Lemma  3 is identical  to that  of Lemma  1  and  is summarized
in  the  appendix. However,  the  distinction  for  the  "low"  constant  returns  to
scale  range  lies  in the  specification  that  kt<k,,  ie  that  the  domestic  capital
stock  lies  below  the  "borrowing-enhanced"  critical  value. Given  this
situation,  and  assuming  zero  outward  capital  mobility,  the  results  of Dechert
and  Nishimura  go through  that  the  capital  stock  will  continue  to  be depleted
at some  rate. As in the  "high"  constant  returns  to  scale  section,  the
constant  marginal  product  of capital  implies  that  DA/k.  will remain  constant,
implying  that  the  credit  ceiling  will  fall  with  declines  in  kt.  The  low-20-
marginal  productivity  of capital  implies  a  negative  growth  path,  with the
capital  stock  asymptotically  approaching  zero.
The  resulting  "borrowing-enhanced"  production  function,  taking  these
three  stages  together,  satisfies  the  "S-shape"  criteria  in  Theorem  1.  In the
two  constant  return  to scale  ranges,  the  linear  increase  in the  credit
constraint  yields  the  result  that  Q'(kt)  will  be greater  than  Q(kt),  but  will
exhibit  constant  returns  to scale.  Between  these  regions  lies  the  "take-
off"  stage  in  which  increases  in  the  physical  capital  stock  both  raise  the
marginal  product  of capital  and  the  credit  ceiling. As in the  constant
marginal  product  ranges,  increases  in output  will raise  the  default  penalty,
raising  the  credit  ceiling  as  well.
HoweveL,  the  "take-off"  stage  will  be characterized  by more  rapid
increases  in  the  credit  ceiling  per  unit  of capital  accumulation.  In
addition  to the  outputt  effect  on the  default  penalty,  increases  in the
marginal  product  of  capital  raise  the  default  penalty  per  unit  of capital.
The  existence  of a take-off  stage  in  production  therefore  implies  a "take-off"
stage  in  borrowing  as  well.  Debtors  in  this  take-off  stage  will experience  an
increase  in  Dt/kt,  their  debt-to-capital  stock  ratios,  as credit  ceilings  are
adjusted  to the  increased  f'(Kt). This  results  in  Q"(kt)  exceeding  Q"(kt).
Moreover,  the  "borrowing-enhanced"  production  function  will  be "S-shaped"
within  this  range,  as suggested  by Theorem  1.
This last  point  is  of some  interest,  since  many  point  to increased
foreign  borrowing  as a source  of debtor  difficulties  in the  early  1980's. An
alternative  interpretation  of this  period,  consistent  with increasing  marginal
product  of  physical  capital  would  be that  the  sub-optimal  credit  ceilings
faced  by borrowers  in  international  markets,  were  eased  in the  1970's  as
countries  accumulated  sufficient  capital  to enter  the  non-convex  range  of the-21-
growth  path. Under  increasing  marginal  product  of  physical  capital,  rapid
increases  in the  debt  to  capital  stock  ratio  may  be consistent  with  rational
behavior  on the  part  of foreign  lenders  if  production  externalities  made t1hese
debtor  nations  more  creditworthy.
3.  Critical  Caoital  Stock  Mass
Dechert  and  Nishimura  have  shown  that  in  an autarky  model,  non-convex
production  technologies  can  lead  to  two  alternative  steady  states  in the
presence  of "mild  discounting." 8 The  results  above  aLi¢  us to form  similar
conclusions  for  a developing  nation  with foreign  borrowing  opportunities.  The
suggestion  is  made in  the  following  theorem:
Theoree  2:  Under  "mild  discounting,"  there  exists  a  critical  level  of capital
stock,  kc,  below  which  private  investment  decisions,  given  the  credit
constraint  faced  by the  debtor,  will  run  the  debtor  nation  capital  stock
asymptotically  to the  origin.
The  proof  is relegated  to  the  appendix. Intuitively,  the  argument  can
be understood  as follows: It  has  been  shown  that  under  "mild  discounting"  and
an S-shaped  production  function  Q-f(kt),  there  is a critical  stock  mass,  ko.
below  which  the  optimal  debtor  response  will  be to  consume  the  capital  stock
asymptotically,  driving  it  to zero  in  the  limit.9 By  Theorem  1, foreign
8The  conditions  for  mild  discounting  in the  presence  of  borrowing
are  shown  in the  appendix.
9Note  that  actual  depletion  of the  capital  stock  will  not take  place
in  finite  time. Although  a long-run  capital  stock  of measure  zero
seems  implausible,  one  can  interpret  this  equilibrium  as a secular
decline  in the  capital  stock  within  a relevant  time  frame  seems
more intuitive.-22-
borrowing  opportunities  are  consistent  with an S-shaped  "borrowing-enharced"
production  function. An additional  source  of  productivity  stems  from  the
impact  of capital  stock  increases  on the  credit  ceiling. Assuming  ct-O  for
simplicity,  the  production  function  Q(k.)  will  satisfy:
(3.1)  Q(ki)  - Q[  h1(k 1)/Jo(Io,ko)  +  (l-6)ko  ]  - xh1(kl)
It  has  been shown  that  with  relatively  few  assumptions  on debtor
behavior,  and  the  fact  that  f(kt)  is  S-shaped,  Q(kt)  will  be S-shaped  as
well,  and  therefore  subject  to the  same  critical  mass  argument  as the  autarky
model. In the  deterministic  model  addressed  here,  repudiation  does  not  occur,
and  the  debtor  chooses  a utility  maximizing  path  subject  to the  constraints  of
this  "borrowing-enhanced"  production  function.
The  critical  capital  stock,  k0, however,  will  be smaller  in the  case
of  a  borrowing  country  than  one  existing  in  autarky. This  follows  from  the
additional  capital  obtainable  by the  debtor  through  his  borrowing  activities.
Essentially,  the  ability  to  borrow  from  abroad  for  a country  with  a marginal
product  of capital  which  exceeds  world  interest  rates  allows  the  debtor  to
"stretch"  his capital  stock  with  additional  foreign  capital  inflows. In  the
presence  of increasing  returns  to  physical  capital,  the  increased  ability  to
borrow  will increase  the  marginal  product  of  capital.
4.  Debt  overhanft  and  non-convex  tecinoloties
The  analysis  above  seems  to fit  well  with  the  empirical  evidence
concerning  creditor  responses  to debtor  nation  difficulties  in  the  1980's. In
particular,  a non-convex  growth  model  may  prove  superior  in  explaining  the-23-
"debt  overhang"  experience  of these  borrowing  countries. I  examine  the
implications  of a  debt  overhang  in this  deterministic  model  by conducting  the
following  theoretical  exercise:  Suppose  that  a  nation  enters  period  t  with  a
stock  of outstanding  debt,  Dt,  that  exceeds  the  debt  ceiling  such  that
rDt>h(kt),  although  the  remaining  periods  are  assumed  to  be deterministic. 10
Since  Vr(kt,Dt)  < Vd(k.),  the  debtor  would  choose  default  over  debt
service. One  can  then  question  the  implications  of four  possible  creditor
strategies:  1.  No additional  lending  or debt  relief,  2.  Rescheduling,  3. "New
Money,"  and  4. Outrigit  Debt  Forgiveness.  I examine  each  in turn.
4.1  No creditor  response
In the  absence  of any  creditor  response,  the  outcome  will depend  upon
the  severity  of the  debt  overhang  and  the  capital  stock  of the  debtor  nation.
This  is stated  as  a proposition:
Proposition  1: Let  the  "debt  overhang"  be described  by the  vector  DO -
(D,,kt).  In the  absence  of  creditor  intervention,  for  all  Dt  > h(k.), there
exists  a critical  capital  stock,  k*,  below  which  the  debtor  nation  capital
stock  will  converge  asymptotically  to  zero,  while  for  k2k*, the  debtor  nation
will converge  to a  growth  path  below  that  which  would  be attainable  if  the
credit  ceiling  were  satisfied.
100f  course,  a loan  for  which  Dt>h(kt)  would  never  be made in  a
deterministic  framework.  However,  I  examine  this  as  a benchmark
case. The  qualitative  distinctions  in  a stochastic  framework  with
risk-neutral  agents  would  be  minimal..24-
Since  the  credit  constraint  is  violated,  Vr(kt,Dt)<Vd(kt).  It follows
that  debtors  will  choose  to default  in the  absence  of creditor  intervention.
Once they  have  defaulted,  debtors  are  assumed  to  be precluded  from
participation  in international  capital  markets. The  result  is that  they
produce  under  an  autarky  S-shaped  production  function,  subject  to  the
productivity  loss  associated  with the  default  penalty,  (l-O)Q(kt).  Given  this
S-shaped  production  function,  Theorem  2 suffices  to  motivate  a critical
capital  stock.
Moreover,  magnitude  cf the  critical  capital  stock,  kc,  will  be
dependent  upon  the  regime  in  place. ke  will  be greater  under  default  than
repayment.  Recall  that  kc  satisfies  pf(kt)  - 1.  Because  of the  combination
of suspension  of  borrowing  opportunities  and  the  default  penalty,  the  kt
necessary  to  satisfy  this  constraint  will  be larger  in the  default  regime. By
the  Euler  equation  associated  with  the  default  regime  (2.7),  it  follows  that
the  level  of investment  chosen  will  be less  than  that  which  would  have  been
chosen  in a repayment  regime  given  the  same  capital  stock,  kt.
Hence,  it is  possible  that  a debtor  nation  may  have  a capital  stock
sufficient  to  lead  towards  positive  growth  only  in  the  presence  of foreign
borrowing. Should  such  a nation  enter  a default  regime,  its  capital  stock
would  no longer  exceeds  the  higher  kc  which  will  be encountered  in  the  default
state. Non-convexities  can  lead  to  quite  disparate  experiences  for  similarly
endowed  countries. It follows  that  in the  neighborhood  of the  critical
capital  stock,  the  potential  benefits  of  keeping  the  debtor  nation  out  of the
default  state  may  be large.
4.2  Rescheduling-25-
Since  creditors  are  assumed  to gain  nothing  from  penalizing  debtors,
it  follows  that  an equilibrium  in  which  the  debtor  nation  is  penalized  would
not  exist  in  this  deterministic  model. The  creditor  can  always  do  better  than
allowing  the  debtor  to  default  by rescheduling  the  amount  the  debtor  is  not
willing  to  pay.  This  "rescheduling  strategy"  consists  of relending  the
difference:
(4.1)  Dt+ 1 - rDt - h(kt).
It is easy  to  verify  that  rescheduling  the  amount  above  is  more  desirable  to
both  creditors  and  debtors  than  allowing  a default. On the  debtor  side,  given
current  required  debt  service  of  h(kt),  the  debtor  is indifferent  between  debt
service  and  default  by definition.  On the  creditor  side,  the  stream  of
payments  exceeds  zero. Since  the  creditor  1F  assumed  to gain  nothing  from
penalizing  the  debtor,  this  stream  is  always  going  to  be preferred.
The  present  value  of  pursuing  the  rescheduling  strategy  is:
(4.2)  h(k,)  +  i  (r) 1 h(k 1)
It is even  possible  for  the  rescheduling  strategy  to  eradicate  the
debt  overhang. In  each  period,  The  creditor  loans  out  D.+.,  according  to
equation  (4.1),  and  receives  h(kt). With  sufficiently  high  growth  in  the
debtor  nation,  the  increase  in  the  penalty  function  can  result  in  h(kt)
growing  faster  than  D.. The  rescheduling  strategy  can  be successful  in
eliminating  the  debt  overhang  if:
(4.3)  e-  (r)  ( 1 t)[rDt  - h(kt)1  S 0.-26-
Equation  (4.3)  clearly  requires  a late  period  in  which  rDe  5 h(kI),  i.e.  in
which  new  lending  is  growing  at a slower  pace  than  the  credit  constraint.
Moreover,  this  future  "repayment"  period  will  be  more  discounted  than  the
initial  rescheduling  period. It follows  that  it is  quite  unlikely  even  if  the
debtor  nation's  credit  constraint  is growing  that  a relending  strategy  will  be
able  to  secure  all  of the  outstanding  nominal  debt  of the  debtor  nation.
The  fact  that  rescheduling  will  take  place  in this  deterministic  model
is  not surprising.  Since  creditors  do  not  gain  from  penalizing  the  debtor
nation,  they  will  obviously  prefer  the  rescheduling  option. It is important
to  note  however,  that  creditors  experience  losses  even  under  this  strategy,  so
the  ability  to  reschedule  is ex-ante  a zero  probability  event  in  a
deterministic  model,  where  the  debt  has  already  been  adjusted  to  satisfy  rDt
a  h(kt).
4.3  Now  Money"
The  question  of actual  "new  money,"  or  net  capital  flows  from
creditors  to  debtors,  is  more  interesting.  Arguments  for  new  money  are
commonly  associated  with the  original  Baker  plan  for  dealing  with  debt
difficulties  of the  developing  nations. However,  the  relending  argument
proposed  in the  Baker  plan  has  been  highly  criticized,  both in  the  popular
press  and  in the  literature.  Lindert  (1987)  shows  in  a static  model  that  "...
whatever  is  wrong  with  old loans  will  be wrong  with  new."  Essentially,  the
Lindert  argument  maintains  that  by increasing  the  future  debt  burden  of the
debtor  nation  in  a  neoclassical  framework,  one is  merely  .ubstituting  future
defaults  for  current  ones.-27-
The  Lindert  argument  is  based  upon  the  specification  that  the  default
penalty  is invariant  to the  capital  stock  of the  debtor  nation.
Alternatively,  models  such  as Cohen  and  Sachs  (1986)  have  the  penalty
increasing  in the  debtor  nation's  capital  stock. However,  with  constant
returns  to scale,  there  will  still  be no reason  to extend  new  capital  to  a
debtor  nation  already  in  difficulty.  By definition,  a debtor  nation  facir,g  an
overhang  has  Dt?h(kt).  In  order  for  new  lending  to  be  viable  alternative  for
the  creditor:
!4  4)  sW  U^)__t)  Oh(kt)
(4.4) EL-  (r)  (±t  1
-91Dt+1
must  hold.  where  Dt+ 1 - Dt+1  - (rDt  - h(kt)1  is the  initial  amount  of "new
money. New  money  provides  an increase  in  the  debtor  nation's  capital  stock,
which  increases  the  default  penalty  in  each  period,  and  hence  the  debtor
nation's  credit  constraint,  h(k.).
With  either  constant  or  decreasing  returns  to scale,  new  money  will
not  be a  viable  alternative.  Since  rDt  <  h(kt),  it  follows  that  some
improvement  in  old  loans  is  necessary  to  motivate  the  extension  of new  loans.
However,  with  constant  marginal  product,  the  value  of old  claims  will  be
invariant  to  new  money.  I  assume  the  best  possible  case  for  new  money,  ie
that  for  which  all  of the  new  money  granted  to the  debtor  nation  is invested
rather  than  consumed. We know  that  Vr(kt)  2 Vd(kt)  for  all  kt,  since  the
debtor  always  has the  option  of defaulting.  Therefore,  a sufficient  condition
for  debt  service  to take  place  is:
(4.5)  OQ(kt)  +  Dt+L  2 rDt.-28-
It follows  that  a sufficient  condition  for  new  lending  to  be rational  is that
the  9-weighted  marginal  product  of capital  exceed  the  interest  rate:
(4.6)  9Q'(k,)  2 r.
The  fact  that  new  lending  to  a debtor  nation  in  e'fficulty  cannot  be
rational  in  a  constant  returns  to scale  framework  is  motivated  by the  fact
that  since  the  debtor  is  credit-constrained,  initial  borrowing  will  have taken
place  up to  the  point  where (4.6)  is  already  violated. Since  (4.6)  implies
that  additional  lending  is  possible,  equilibrium  under  constant  returns  to
scale  implies  that  it  must  be violated. In other  words,  since  lenders  lent
initially  up to the  point  at  which  the  credit  constraint  was  binding,  the
adverse  impact  to the  capital  stock  in  no  way allowed  for  additional  lending
since  Q'(kt)  is invariant  in  kt. With  constant  marginal  product  of  capital,
the  initial  equilibrium  requires  that:
ah(kt)  dQ  dI*  at
(4.7)  Z:  . - ->0.
8Q(kt)  dKtt  aJt  aDt+l
Once  non-convexity  is introduced  into  the  aggregate  production
function,  the  potential  for  rational  relending  improves. Moreover,  new  money
may  not  only  improve  debt  service  on old  loans  and  be in  the  creditors
interest,  it  may  move  a  problem  debtor  from  the  low  growth  path  back to the
high  growth  path.  This  argument  is stated  more  formally  in  the  following
proposition:-29-
Proposition  2: Given  Q"(kt)  > 0,  a parameter  space  exists  in  which  new  money
in the  presence  of a  debt  overhang  DO  - (Dt,kt)  may  be a Pareto-improving
activity.  Moreover,  a unique  level  of rational  new  lending,  D*,  will  exist
such  that  all  rational  new  loans  satisfy  Dt;D*.
Consider  the  case  of a  debt  overhang  DO  - (Dt,kt)  which  satisfies
ks<kok.  Levels  of rational  new lending,  J+i  may  exist  for  which  Dt
satisfies  Dtsh(k.).  The  distinction  with the  constant  marginal  product  case  is
that  the  creditor  has the  ability  to  affect  the  performance  of  his  outstanding
loans  through  the  extension  of  new  money. By increasing  the  debtor's  marginal
product  of capital,  The  creditor  increases  the  default  penalty  and  hence
lowers  the  magnitude  of the  debt  overhang. Given  that  case,  the  creditor
would  benefit  by issuing  a loan  Dt"+  which  led  to a smaller  future  discounted
debt  overhang  than  the  current  one.
The  equilibrium  pattprn  will  be one  in  which  the  creditor  extends  an
unsustainable  loan  in  each  period,  in the  sense  that  rDt>h(kt),  with  the
knowledge  that  in the  following  period,  he will  pursue  the  same  strategy. Two
possible  outcomes  of this  strategy  exist: If the  range  of increasing  returns
to scale  is large  enough,  the  strategy  may  eliminate  the  debt  overhang,
leaving  the  debtor  free  to renew  regular  borrowing  activities.  Alternatively,
the  borrower  may attain  k^k5 with  a  remaining  debt  overhang. At this  stage,
as in the  Lindert  case,  there  is  no reason  to relend  to a  borrower  in
difficulty  and  the  debt  must  be rescheduled  to  avoid  borrower  default.
The  return  from  new lending  of  amount  D*t+  satisfies:-30-
(8)  ah(kt)  a2Q akt  aQ aIt  aJt
(4.8)  -- Dt+l  + S:it  (r)-t)~-[  . .
a4(kt)  aktaD+  aKt~ aJi  aD~
aDt+l  d()  kDt+1  dKt  dt  dt+1
Returns  from  new  money  in  the  non-convex  range  stem  from  two  sources:
First,  the  new  money  will  be invested  domestically,  increasing  the  default
penalty  by increasing  output.  However,  as in the  constant  returns  to scale
range,  this  alone  would  be insufficient  to  motivate  new  money. Secondly,  the
marginal  product  of both  old  and  new  capital  will  be increasing  due  to the
positive  impact  of increased  investment.  This  secondary  effect  creates  the
potential  for  rational  new lending. To  paraphrase  Lindert,  not  only  might  new
loans  be  viable  in the  face  of  bad  old  loans,  they  may  improve  the  quality  of
those  loans  as  well.
Finally,  the  unique  Dt+l  can  be found  by setting  equation  (4.8)  equal
to zero. One  can  verify  that  the  solution  is a  maximum  since  Q'''(kt)<O  even
in the  non-convex  range.
4.3  Debt  forgiveness
Debt  forgiveness  has  been  motivated  in  the  literature  in terms  of the
implications  they  have  for  debtor  investment  decisions  [Helpman  (1987)].
These  models  include  some  implicit  tax  on debtor  nation  output  which  is
increasing  in  the  nominal  debt  burden  of the  debtor  nation. However,  when
willingness  to  pay  is the  binding  criteria  rather  than  seizure,  the
desirability  of debt  forgiveness  becomes  questionable  from  the  creditor's
point  of  view,  both relative  to  rescheduling  and  relending  within  the  non-
convex  range:-31-
Proposition  3:  For  all  debt  overhangs  DO  - (Dt,kt),  outright  debt
forgiveness  will  be dominated  by a rescheduling  strategy.
I distinguish  between  two  types  of  debt  forgiveness.  Nominal  debt
write-downs  consist  of  write-downs  to  levels  above  h(kt). To induce  debt
service,  these  "small"  debt  write-downs  must  be supplemented  by additional
rescheduling.  The  amount  rescheduled  satisfies:
(4.9)  Dt+1  - rDt - x - h(kt)
where  x is  the  nominal  debt  write-down.
These  small  debt  write-downs  will  never  be  preferred  to  complete
rescheduling,  since  creditors  are  giving  up their  claims  on future  debt
service  payments.' 1 Hence  small  debt  write-downs  of  magnitude  x, where  x<rDt
- h(kt)  will  never  be optimal  from  a creditor's  point  of  view.
Large  debt  write-downs,  however,  will  not  induce  debt  service  either.
The  relative  ineffectiveness  of debt  forgiveness  in  this  overhang  model  stems
from  the  fact  that  h(kt)  is  invariant  to the  nominal  outstanding  debt. Once
faced  with  this  overhang,  both  creditors  and  debtors  know that  the  creditors
can  only  obtain  h(kt)  in  each  period,  so that  their  best  strategy  is  one  of
rescheduling  the  overhang,  with  possible  relending  in the  non-convex  range  as
discussed  above.
11There  may  of  course  be small  debt  write-downs  which  would
never  be binding. Both  creditors  and  debtors  would  obviously  be
indifferent  to  these  trivial  write-downs.-32-
5.  Liouldit!  trAM
It is  easy  to imagine  a case  of collective  action  difficulty  in  which
a debtor  may  be solvent,  in  the  sense  that  an injection  of new  money  would  be
rational  from  the  point  of  view  of creditors  as  a  whole,  but "temporary  market
difficulties" 12 preclude  a loan  of  amount  Dt  *. In this  case,  since  the  debtor
will  choose  to  default  in  the  absence  of  outside  intervention,  no new  lending
will  be forthcoming.  Within  the  range  Qkk>O,  the  non-convexity  of the
aggregate  production  function  may  play  a perverse  role  in the  debtor's  growth
outcome.
A temporary  interruption  from  capital  markets  would  lower  the  debtor's
capital  stock. In  a neoclassical  model,  this  would  increase  the  debtor's
marginal  product  of capital  and  leave  the  debtor  more  creditworthy  in the  next
period. In  a non-convex  model,  the "temporary"  capital  shock  lowers  the
credit  constraint,  which  may  leave  the  capital  stock  even  lower  in the
following  period. As a result,  temporary  liquidity  problems  can  become
permanent.  This  conjecture  is  stated  as the  final  Proposition:
Proposition  4:  Given  Q"(k,)>O,  a "temporary"  liquidity  shortage  can  lead  a
debtor  to a  permanent  low  growth  path.
The  proof  follows  from  Theorem  2.  Given  ko<k0,  a  debtor  nation  will
be on the  low  growth  path. Recall  that  kc  is  higher  in the  default  regime
than  within  the  repayment  regime,  due  to the  production  penalty  and  the
12An empirical  example  may  be Brazil  in  August  1982. Due  to
the  Mexican  default,  all  credit  extended  towards  Latin  America
was  lowered.  Presumably,  this  was initially  a temporary  response,
but  Brazil's  difficulties  have lingered  and increased.-33-
exclusion  from  future  borrowing. It  follows  that  a range  exists  in  which  a
temporary  liquidity  shock  which  leaves  the  debtor  in default  and  below  the
default  regime  critical  capital  stock,  kc,  lowers  the  marginal  product  of
capital  in  the  debtor  nation  sufficiently  to  preclude  positive  capital
accumulation  in the  debtor  nation. From  the  default  regime  Euler  equation
(2.7),  optimization  leaves  the  capital  stock  even  lower  in  the  next  period.
Hence,  the  marginal  product  of capital  is  lowered  again.
This  represents  a case  where  either  debtor-government  intervention,  in
tne  form  of forced  investment  of its  private  citizens,  or  a transfer  from  an
external  source  is  necessary  if  the  debtor  is to  once  again  attain  the  high
growth  path. 13 Private  borrowing  by the  debtor  government  will  be constrained
below  that  level  which  would  allow  the  debtor  to  achieve  kt;k..  Unlike  a
neoclassical  model,  temporary  shocks  can  lead  to  permanent  growth  changes. It
follows  that  the  potential  for  Pareto-improving  official  intervention  is
enhanced  in  a non-convex  growth  model  with  borrowing  opportunities.
However,  the  conditions  for  a "creditor  panic"  should  not  be ignored.
If  any  individual  bank  was  willing  to lend  the  amount  necessary  for  the  debtor
to  achieve  the  solvent  growth  path,  the  high  growth  equilibrium  would  emerge.
In  other  words,  the  absence  of such  a  bank  requires  a richer  model  of  both
risk  aversion  and  collective  action  difficulties  among  banks,  as in  Sachs
(1984). Non-convexity  in  the  aggregate  production  function  alone  is  not  a
sufficient  condition  for  temporary  liquidity  shocks  to lead  to  permanent
growth  effects.
13Note that  within  the  class  of increasing  returns  to scale  models,
the  possibility  exists  that  depletion  of the  capital  stock  is socially,
as  well as  privately,  optimal. In these  cases,  the  motivation  for
government  intervention  is  unclear.-34-
7.  Conclusion
In this  paper,  a model  of  lending  under  sovereign  risk  with  non-
convexity  in the  aggregate  production  function  was introduced.  The
introduction  of this  non-standard  technology  was  shown  to lead  to  quite
different  conclusions  concerning  both  the  relationship  between  borrowing  an'
the  domestic  marginal  product  of  capital,  and  the  proper  policy  prescriptions
concerning  a country  facing  a debt  overhang. For  example,  the  model  above
yielded  predictions  concerning  the  viability  of relending  policies,  and the
relative  desirability  of relending  vs.  debt  forgiveness  from  the  point  of  view
of creditors,  which  run  counter  to those  found  in  a  neoclassical  model  of dabt
and  growth. It should  be stressed  that  the  theoretical  results  above  require
only  that  the  marginal  product  of  capital  be increasing  in  the  capital  stock,
and  do  not  require  the  more stringent  coefficient  restrictions  of  constant
returns  to  scale  necessary  for  balanced  growth.
An interesting  empirical  note  concerning  the  dominance  of relending
emerges  from  the  1989  write-down  deal  negotiated  with  Mexico. Given  the
choice  between  nominal  write-downs  and  relending,  a  portion  of the  banks
voluntarily  chuse  a combination  of  new  money  and  forgiveness,  even  though  the
level  of credit  extended  towards  that  country  appears  likely  to result  in
future  reschedulings.  Perhaps  the  non-convex  production  technology  results
helps  to  explain  the  willingness  of some  creditors  to  participate  in  new  money
arrangements.  14
14OHowever,  new  money  participation  was  not  universal. The
actions  of banks  such  as  J.P.  Morgan  to limit  their  exposure  may
indicate  that  even  if  some  creditors  believe  in increasing  returns  to
capital  in  Mexico,  the  belief  is  hardly  universal.-35-
In this  appendix  I  define  the  conditions  for  "mild  discounting"  in  a
Dechert  and  Nishimura  sense  which  allows  for  a  critical  capital  stock  in  a
model  with  borrowing  possibilities.  I  then  prove  theorem  1,  proving  Lemmas
1,2,  and  3, and  theorem  2.
I. Conditions  for  mild  discounting
Dechert  and  Nishimura  show  that  for "intermediate  discounting,"  BQ'(O)
< 1  < Pmax[Q(k)/k],  a critical  capital  stock  exists,  even  for  concave  utility
functions.  In order  to  adapt  this  criterion  to  one  with  borrowing
opportunities,  the  credit  constraint  faced  by the  debtor  nation  at  kt-O  must
be specified.  Within  the  range  of constant  returns  to scale,  Cohen  and  Sachs
have shown  that  the  credit  constraint  increases  linearly  with  the  capital
stock.  I  assume  that  the  capital  stock  at zero  is  within  the  constant  returns
to  scale  range  such  that:
(A.1)  [h(kt)lkz-O]  - 0.
Then the  condition  for  intermediate  discounting  in the  presence  of
borrowing  opportunities  consistent  with the  conclusions  of  Dechert  and
Nishimura  satisfies:
(A.2)  PQ(O)  <  1  s PQ(ko)/ko
for  all  ko.
II. Proof of Theorem 1
A credit  constraint  similar  to that  proposed  in  Lemmas  1  and  3 is
derived  in Cohen  and  Sachs. I summarize  the  derivation  here. Let  VZ(ko,DO)
represent  the  discounted  value  to the  debtor  nation  of remaining  in the
repayment  regime. Since  Vr(ko,Da)  is  strictly  decreasing  in  Do,  there  is  a
unique  h(kO)-DO/kO  which  satisfies
(A.3) Vx(kO,D  )_Vd(ko).
Moreover,  Cohen  and  Sachs  show  that  if  DO/ko-h,  ie if  the  credit  constraint  is
binding,  aVr/ah<O. It  follows  that  there  exists  a unique  h  for  which
Vr(kO,Do)-Vd(kO).
Given  the  existence  and  uniqueness  of a credit  constraint  within  the
range  of constant  returns  to  scale,  it  is straightforward  to show  that  the
level  of the  credit  constraint,  D.,  will  be increasing  in  ko. Totally
differentiating  (A.3)  with  respect  to  Doand  ko  yields:
aDo aVd(ko)/ako  _ BVr(Do,ko)/ako
(A.4)  - >  0
ako  aVr(DO,kO)/8DO
In  both the  constant  returns  to scale  and  the  increasing  returns  to
scale  ranges,  8DO/ako 0 O since  Vr  is  decreasing  in  D..  However,  Lemma  2  claims-36-
that  within  the  non-convex  portion  of the  production  function,  an increase  in
the  capital  stock  raises  the  credit  constraint  at a greater  rats  than  constant
rate. To prove  this  Lemma,  differentiate  equation  (A.4)  with  respect  to  ko
obtaining:
d2Do  d2 (k,)/ak2  _  aVr2  (DOIk)/ak2 O D0 OV ( 0)/0 0 - V( 0 k)8 0
(A.5)  _  _ _-
ako2 aVt  (DO9kO)/aD 0
Recall  that  Q'(kt)>O,  but  within  the  range  of increasing  returns,
Qn(k,)>0  as  well.  Holding  Do  constant,  the  sign  of aVt 2(ko)/ako  will depend
upon  the  magnitude  of Q"(k.). Since  Q"(kt)  is  equal  to  zero  within  the  range
of constant  returns,  it  follows  that WVr 2(ko)/ako  - 0 as  well.  Within  the
range  of  aggregative  production  externalities,  however,  8Vr 2(ko)/ako  will  be
positive. An identical  argument  goes  through  for  aVd2(kO)/ako,  so that  the
numerator  of equation  (A.7)  will  be zero  within  the  CRS  range. Thte
denominator  is  unambiguously  negative  since  u"(ct)<O. It follows  that
02Do/ckc 2 is  equal  to  zero  within  the  CRS  range.
For  the  range  of increasing  returns  to  scale,  the  sign  will  depend
upon  the  relative  magnitudes  of aV (k,)/ak'  and  aVr2(D  k  2)/Ok,  both  of  which
are  positive. Since  a change  in  ko  will  only  enter  through  its  effect  upon
output,  it is  sufficient  to  compare  Qkk  for  the  two  regimes. The  default
penalty  yields  a disparity,  ie  Qk-Q"(ko)>O  in the  repayment  regime,  while
Q -(I-O)Q"(k,)>0  in the  default  regime.  Holding  ko  constant,  it is  clear  that
I*-  d  2  <  aVr2  2  8~~  ~~~~~~~~2  02 %k  > Q;k  . It  follows  that  aVN2(ko)/ako  < 8Vr 2(DO9kO)/akO.  Hence,  8  Do/ak 0
is  positive  within  the  range  of increasing  returns  to scale.
Given  that  h(ko)-Do/ko  is  a  constant  in  the  CRS  ranges  and  increasing
in  the  range  of  production  externalities,  one  need  only  observe  the
"borrowing-enhanced"  production  function  subject  to  h(kt)  to  complete  the
proof  of theorem  1.  For  simplicity,  assume  zero  consumption.  The  production
function  can  then  be  written:
(A.6)  Q(k 1) - Q[ hl(kl)/Jo(Io,ko)  +  (l-6)ko  ]  - xh 1(kl)
Differentiating  with  respect  to  k,  yields:
(A.7)  Q'(k 1) - Q'(k 1)[h 1
1(k1)/JO(IO,kO)]  - 1  1(kl)  > 0.
Q'(kl)  >  0 since  Q'(k 1)/JO(IO,kO)  - r  > 0,  must  be satisfied  for  rational
borrowing. Differentiating  (A.9)  with  respect  to  k,  yields:
(A.8)  Q"(kl)  - Q"(kl)[hl(kl)/Jo)]  +  [Q'(kl)/J 0)- rJ]hl(k 1).
Within  the  range  of CRS,  the  second  term  will  be equal  to zero  since
h,"(kl)-O.  This  additional  term  becomes  positive  within  the  range  of
aggregate  production  externalities,  increasing  Q"(k,). This  completes  the
proof  of  Theorem  1.
III.  Proof  of  Theorem  2
The  proof  of  Theorem  2 depends  upon  the  result  that  Q(ko)  is an S-
shaped  production  function,  as shown  in  Theorem  1.  The  results  of Dechert  and
Nishimura  for  optimal  investment  relative  to  an S-shaped  production  function-37-
now  hold for  the  "borrowing-enhanced"  production  function  Q(ko). Since  the
capital  stock  of the  debtor  nation,  ko,  completely  describes  the  current  state
of the  debtor  nation  given  some  stock  of  debt,  Do$  I  continue  the  proof  in
terms  of  Q(ko)  assuming  some  D..
Dechert  and  Nishimura  show  that  a kc  exists  for  an S-shaped  production
function  for  which  every  optimal  path  starting  from  ko  >  kc  converges  to  a
steady  state  at  which  k-k  Similarly,  for  ko<k.,  all  optimal  paths  starting
from  ko  converge  to the  origin.
The  only  distinction  in the  current  specification,  once  the  S-shape  of
the  borrowing-enhanced  production  function  has  been  established,  is  that  the
high  growth  path in  the  current  model  converges  to  a level  of steady-state
growth  in the  capital  stock,  rather  than  a constant  capital  level. However,
this  is  a trivial  modification.
Consider  the  optimal  path  discussed  above.  The  steady  state  capital
stock,  k ,  is  never  one  of maximum  marginal  product  [See  Najumdar  and  Mitra].
Consider  two  capital  stocks,  ko  and  k.,  which  satisfy  k,<k,<k,  and
Q'(k,)<Q'(k,).  Suppose  that  ko-k  . Then  Q'(k*)<Q'(k,).  But if  this  is
true,  then  k  is  not  a steady  state  [see  Majumdar  and  Mitra  (1982)].
Therefore,  k  cannot  lie  within  the  range  of increasing  returns  to  scale.
Having  shown  that  k*  does  not  lie  in increasing  returns  range,  and
given  that  the  optimal  path  is  monotonic  in  capital,  it follows  that  the
optimal  path  when  k0>ke  will  enter  the  high  CRS  range. Once  in this  range,  a
steady-state  will exist  with  h (ko)-DO/ko,  as discussed  in  the  text. This
completes  the  proof  of Theorem  2.-38-
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